Pricing carbon: a climate coalition as a complement to UN negotiations.

    Forskningsoutput: KonferensbidragArbetsdokument

    Sammanfattning

    This paper analyzes insufficiencies in UN negotiations and identifies a set of characteristics that would make a complementary institutional design efficient. A coalition among nations with high climate ambitions is suggested. Such a coalition should introduce measures that leaders can control and be accountable for—measures that are short-term and fewdimensional, and that incentivize efficient reductions, prevent leakages to outside nations, and sanction non-compliance. A coalition should also provide incentives to outside emitters and encourage new members. A Climate Coalition that harmonizes minimum national carbon prices (i.e. carbon taxes), introduces a common carbon tariff, and welcomes new members would meet the criteria and have the potential to emerge at a global level.

    OriginalspråkEngelska
    StatusPublicerad - 2017
    EvenemangSIOE 2017 - 21st Annual Conference of the Society for Institutional & Organizational Economics -
    Varaktighet: 1980-jan.-01 → …

    Konferens

    KonferensSIOE 2017 - 21st Annual Conference of the Society for Institutional & Organizational Economics
    Period80-01-01 → …

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    • Annan samhällsvetenskap (509)

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