There is an increased pressure for firms to provide the financial market with additional information. Such disclosure is attached with different kinds of costs. In spite of these costs, and in spite of increased mandatory disclosures, firms choose to voluntary disclosure financial information to analysts and others. This indicates that firms also benefit from providing additional information. The subjects of this study is 431 annual reports from firms listed at the Stockholm Stock Exchange for 2002 and 2005 and the objective is to survey factors that can explain variations in firms’ voluntary disclosure. The findings not only support explanations from agency theory and positive accounting theory (ownership structure, leverage and size) but also explanations that can be derived from institutional theory and “international capital market pressures” (international listing, industry and regulation). One conclusion is that some regulation is necessary to avoid underproduction of information, whilst to much regulation (such as SOX) leads to an “unintended chilling effect”.
- Juridik (505)